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Salt Lake County submits the following reply in support of its appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. ASSUMING THAT THE COURT DETERMINES THAT THE 
STANDARD OF REVIEW IN NOT CORRECTION OF ERROR, THE 
FACTS HAVE BEEN PROPERLY MARSHALED AND APPELLANT HAS 
DEMONSTRATED THEIR INSUFFICIENCY TO SUPPORT THE 
COMMISSION'S ORDER. 
The County marshaled the evidence supporting the Commission's Order in its opening 
brief at pp. 8-9. Alexander cites a number of cases under his Point I about this mandatory 
requirement but he has failed to demonstrate that the County has not appropriately set forth 
the facts within its argument. However, this court only requires that competent trial evidence 
which supports the challenged findings be presented. West Valley City v. Majestic 
Investment Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Utah App.1991). The County has set forth the 
evidence relied upon by the Commission to support its findings and has shown the 
misapplication of that evidence by the Commission. 
The Commission defined its task as follows: 
Consequently, in order for the Appeals Board to determine whether 
Mr. Alexander's claim is barred by the "coming and going" rule, it is 
necessary to consider the degree to which Mr. Alexander's travel was for 
the County's benefit and under the County's control. 
Order Denying Motion for Review. (R. at 176). The Commission concluded that the 
predominant benefit of Alexander's travel at the time of the accident inured to the County 
and consequently his injuries arose in the course of his employment. 
In support of this legal conclusion, the Commission found that Alexander's travel was 
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pursuant to County policy; the County received greater law enforcement coverage throughout 
the County; Alexander was required to carry firearms, a uniform, and "other equipment;" and 
he was required to monitor the radio and respond to calls when feasible. Id. The 
Commission concluded that the presence of Alexander's visually-impaired wife as a 
passenger did not preclude his law enforcement response during rush hour. Id. 
Although there is no Utah cases directly on point involving the travel of police officer 
who is injured in a police vehicle while engaged in a personal errand, Alexander's case is 
basically indistinguishable from VanLeeuwen v. Industrial Comm'n, 901 P.2d281 (UT App. 
1995), cert, denied 910 P.2d 426 (UT 1995). 
In that case, the employee was injured in an automobile accident while driving the 
company's vehicle to the main office. The employee was a "project supervisor" supervising 
other employees and transporting them to and from various work cites. Id. at 283. In that 
case, this court applied the substantial benefit test in denying compensation: 
A review of the record indicates that the primary benefit to Custom in 
providing VanLeeuwen with a company-owned truck was his arrival at 
work. However, mere arrival at work is not considered a substantial 
benefit to the employer. See Lundberg v. Cream O Weber. 24 Utah 2d 
16, 18-19,465 P.2d 175. 176 (1970) (holding that travel to work earlier 
than normal for special meeting not essential to employment); Cross, 824 
P.2dat 1205 (holding that arrival at work not substantial benefit); Santa 
Rosa Junior College v. W.C.A.B.. 40 Cal.3d 345. 220 Cal.Rptr. 94. 97. 
708 P.2d 673, 676 (1985) (holding that "an employee going to and from 
his place of employment is not rendering any service, and begins to 
render such service only when [arriving at the place of employment.]" 
(citations omitted)); Rinehart v, Mossman-Gladden, Inc.* 77 N.M. 470. 
423 P.2d 991. 992 (1967) (holding that "injury is compensable only 
where the journey is an inherent part of the service for which the 
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employee is compensated or where the travel itself is a substantial part 
of service for which the employee is compensated or where the travel 
itself is a substantial part of the service performed.") 
Additionally, VanLeeuwen was not performing any service arising out 
of an in the course of his employment on the morning of the accident. 
Custom did not require VanLeeuwen to perform any job-related service 
or use the vehicle as a business instrumentality while traveling to or from 
work. VanLeeuwen was not on an employment related "special errand" 
or "special mission" at the time of the accident. VanLeeuwen was not 
being compensated for his time spent traveling between his home and 
Custom's office. The accident did not occur on Custom's premises, nor 
did VanLeeuwen's duties require him to be at the place where the 
accident occurred. The risk that caused the accident was one common 
to the traveling public and was not created by duties connect with his 
employment. See Rinehart, 423 P.2d at 992. We therefore conclude that 
the Commission's finding that VanLeeuwen received the majority of the 
benefit from his use of the truck was supported by substantial evidence. 
Id. at 285. 
In the case at bar, Alexander's journey was even further removed from his 
employment than VanLeeuwen's travel. VanLeeuwen was going to work. Alexander was 
transporting this wife on her personal errands. Alexander was dressed in civilian clothing 
as was his wife. He was driving an unmarked vehicle with civilian plates; he was not even 
projecting to the public that he was operating any type of government vehicle. He was not 
at his office performing his administrative tasks. He was not traveling on County business 
at the time and place of the accident. He was not engaged in police duties at the time he 
received his injuries. He had no intent to engage in any police activities at the time he was 
involved in this accident. He was not being compensated for his travel. He was not engaged 
in any special errand for the Sheriff at the time of the accident. The accident did not occur 
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during Alexander's scheduled work hours. Sheriffs office business did not require him to 
be at the place where the accident occurred. He was not under the control of the Sheriff at 
the time and place of the accident. He could not respond to police incidents with his wife as 
a passenger. He was not subject to any employment-related risks greater than any of the rush 
hour freeway commuters driving around him at the time and place of the accident. The 
Sheriff had not picked Alexander's route. The Sheriff had no knowledge of Alexander's 
location or what he was doing at the time of the accident, until he reported in after the 
accident. At the time and place of the accident Alexander and his wife were receiving the 
majority of benefit of the use of the Sheriffs office vehicle. 
In short, the Commission erroneously analyzed the coming-and-going rule. Even if 
this court determines that deference should be extended to Commission's ruling, its 
application to the law of these facts and its conclusion exceed the bounds of reasonableness 
and rationality. VanLeeuwen at 284. 
POINT II. ALEXANDER HAS PROVIDED NO CASES HELPFUL TO 
THIS COURT IN SUPPORTING HIS DECISION AS THEY ARE EASILY 
DISTINGUISHABLE ON THEIR FACTS AND LEGAL THEORIES. 
Alexander cites a number of cases from other jurisdictions to bolster his claim that he 
is entitled to compensation. All of these cases are easily distinguishable from the facts of his 
case and by Utah law. He relies on Montgomery County v. Wade, 345 Md. 1,690 A.2d 990 
(1997). There the officer was operating her marked police cruiser which the court 
determined was "providing a police service to the extent that the PPV (Personal Patrol 
Vehicle) is a visual deterrent to criminal activity," and that this benefit inured to the 
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employing agency. 690 A.2d at 993. That agency's policy's encouraged off duty officers 
to use their PPV's "in order to ... alleviate budget and staffing concerns and increase police 
presence throughout the county." Id. at 994. Alexander projected no such visual presence 
as he was driving an unmarked car, wearing civilian clothing, and transporting his civilian 
wife to her employment. 
Tighe v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dept. 110 Nev. 632, 877 P.2d 1032 (1994), is also 
distinguishable. In that case, the court recognized two exceptions to the coming and going 
rule in extending coverage to officer Tighe. First, the court concluded that the department 
benefitted from his driving the undercover vehicle by his ability to respond immediately to 
a call while driving. Id. at 1036. The court extended coverage because: 
Tighe was on call and driving a police vehicle equipped with a police 
radio, and he was prepared to respond to any public emergency he may 
have encountered. Tighe made no diversion for personal purposes, nor 
can we reweigh the evidence to conclude that the he significantly 
deviated from the standard of conduct we expect of our police officers. 
Id. at 636. Alexander could not have responded to an emergency and he was running a 
personal errand at the time of his accident. 
In City of Springfield v. Industrial Comm'n. 244 Ill.App.3d 408, 614 N.E.2d 478, 
(1993), the officer was returning to duty from a lunch break while monitoring the radio. The 
court extended coverage because: 
In this case, claimant was returning to duty after lunch and was not only 
subject to being "on call"; he had his radio turned on and was "on call" 
to the extent he would have responded in the normal course to any 
request for assistance or emergency he encountered. 
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In this sense, claimant was not acting outside his employment-related 
duties or engaged in a purely personal diversion or enterprise. 
614 N.E.2d at 480. Contrary to Alexander's contentions, even Illinois does not extend 
compensation when the officer is injured while on a personal errand. Siens v. Industrial 
Common. 84 I11.2d 361, 418 N.E.2d 749,751 (1981) (village marshal injured when police 
shotgun discharged while preparing to go hunting not compensable as officer "not 
performing an act incidental to his employment); and Wolland v. Industrial Comm'n, 91 
IU.2d 58, 434 N.E.2d 1132 (1982) (officer injured when removing his weapon not entitled 
to compensation even though required to be armed at all times and subject to call at any 
time). Alexander was acting outside his employment related-duties and he was engaged in 
a personal errand at the time he received his injury. 
Alexander's reliance upon Botke v. Chippewa County, 210 Mich.App. 66, 533 N.W. 
2d 7 (1995) is also misplaced. Worker's compensation was extended to the officer under the 
dual purpose doctrine because Botke was in uniform, driving the only active police vehicle 
in the county and which was fully marked and equipped as a police cruiser. He was 
monitoring the radio and required to respond to police business. 533 N.W.2d at 7-8. The 
court found the county benefitted from the deterrent effect of a marked patrol vehicle 
cruising through the county. Id. See Chambo v. City of Detroit. Police Department, 83 
Mich.App. 623,269 N.W.2d 243 (1978) (uniformed officer in own vehicle in driving to duty 
station not involved in compensable accident even though required to live within city, 
carrying city-issued firearm, wearing badge at all times, and requiring his response to crimes 
even if off duty because accident occurred outside of employment-related activity). 
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Similarly, the other cases cited by Alexander extended coverage because the officers' 
acts were work related in some manner. In Carrillo v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 
149 Cal.App.3d 1177, 1180-81 (5th Dist.1983), coverage was extend because the reserve 
deputy was in uniform and projected a police presence, she was traveling to her duty station, 
and she was required to respond to police emergencies. In Mineral County v. Industrial 
Common, 649 P.2d 728, 730 (Colo. 1982), coverage was extended because the deputy was 
in uniform, he was the only officer of the department, he was literally on duty twenty-four 
hours, he had no set shift, and if he had deviated for a personal errand he had returned to 
agency's business. See Rogers v. Industrial Comm'n, 40 Colo.App.313, 574P.2dll6,117 
(1978). (uniformed and armed officer riding own motorcycle on way to work involved in 
automobile accident not entitled to compensation as he was not "actually engaged in 
performance of law enforcement activities"). In City of Sherwood v. Lowe. Ark.App.161, 
628 S.W.2d 610 (1982), cited by Alexander, coverage was found when the officer was en 
route to work because he was in uniform, armed, driving vehicle with police lights, and 
giving the county the benefit of armed and uniformed officer on street. Alexander's personal 
journey conveyed no such message to the public. 
Plaintiff relies also on Collier v. County of Nassau. 46 A.D.2d 970,362 N.Y. S.2d 52 
(1974), for the proposition that the officer involved in an accident while using the agency's 
vehicle provides a sufficient bases to trigger compensation. This proposition has not been 
accepted by Utah courts. See VanLeeuwen. supra at 285 (arrival at work not substantial 
benefit to employer to trigger coverage). 
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In fact, the police officer exception to the coming-and-going rule has been rejected 
soundly by other jurisdictions, as set forth in Walker v. State Accident Insurance Fund, 28 
Or.App. 127, 448 P.2d 1270 (1977): 
As the New York court noted in discussing a similar claim: 
***So far as the argument that he was subject to call twenty-four hours 
a day is concerned the simple answer is that he had finished his regular 
work and had not been called for anything further. Moreover on the 
basis of his own admission he was not engaged at the time of the 
accident in any work connected with his duties as a policeman. To say 
that any accident which he sustained when not on post duty was covered 
because he was subject to call and required to act as a policeman should 
the occasion require, is somewhat unrealistic. If, as in the case here, he 
was injured at a time when he was off active duty and was engaged in an 
activity in no way connected with his duties as a policeman, it cannot be 
said with any semblance of logic that the injury arose out of his 
employment.' Matter of Blackley v. City of Niagara Falls, 284 
App.Div.51. 53. 130 N.Y.S.2d 77. 79 (1954). 
Accord: McKiernan v. New Haven. 151 Conn.496. 199 A.2d 695 
(1964): Simerlink v. Young. 172 Ohio St. 427. 178 N.E.2d 168 (1961). 
558P.2datl271. 
Finally, Alexander also relies on the unpublished case of Delaware v. Glascock. 1997 
W L 524078 (Del.Super.1997) (unpublished, copy attached), as supporting his claim for 
coverage. In that case, Glascock was killed in an automobile accident approximately twenty 
minutes after his standard shift had ended. However, at the time of his accident he was 
operating the employer's vehicle, which could only be used for official business. That 
vehicle was equipped with police radios and a cellular phone. More particularly was the fact 
that he was on twenty-four hours call and he was required to respond at any time to the prison 
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or the hospitals where prisoners were taken for treatment. The prison warden testified at the 
hearing that if Glascock was traveling from the prison to meet officers at the hospital he was 
on duty, although he did not know whether Glascock was responding to such a call at the 
exact time of his accident. Critical to the court's finding was that if Glascock responded after 
regular work hours, he was given compensation time. Under Delaware law, the employer's 
furnishing of a vehicle was sufficient to bring the worker within coverage. In the case at bar, 
Alexander's own testimony affirmed that he was engaged in a purely personal errand for his 
wife before the accident, at the time and place of the accident, and he would have remained 
engaged in that personal errand in the immediate future. 
CONCLUSION 
The Commission's Order is unsupportable regardless of which standard of review this 
court employs. All of the facts supporting the Order have been outlined in the County's 
briefs and the Commission's application of the law to these facts is neither reasonable nor 
rational. The Commission's application of the coming-and-going rule is erroneous. Under 
the Commission's approach it is almost impossible to conceive of an occasion where the rule 
would preclude coverage when any officer operates any police vehicle and is involved in an 
accident. The Commission, in effect, has created a "police vehicle" exception to the coming-
and-going rule, which exceeds its statutory authority and the cases pronounced by the Utah 
courts. Its order should be reversed and the Commission ordered to deny coverage. 
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ADDENDUM 
Attached are the following: 
1. The unpublished case of Delaware v. Glascock, 1997 W.L. 524078 
(Del.Super.1997). 
DATED this ^ _ day of July, 2006. 
DAVID E. YOCOM 
Salt Lake District Attorney 
J^pSAKALOS 
Deputy District Attorney 
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UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING. 
Superior Court of Delaware. 
STATE OF DELAWARE Employer-Appellant, 
v. 
George GLASCOCK, Employee-Appellee. [FN1] 
FN1. This is the proper caption for this case. The appeal was incorrectly filed as 
"GEORGE GLASCOCK, Employee-Appellant v. STATE OF DELAWARE, 
Employer-Appellee." The Court orders that the Prothontary's Office change the caption 
to the correct one. 
No. 97A-01-001. 
July 14,1997. 
David G. Culley, Tybout, Redfearn & Pell, Wilmington, for Employer-Appellant. 
William Schab, Schab & Barnett, P.A., Georgetown, for Claimant-Appellee. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
Date Submitted: May 5, 1997 
Date Decided: July 14, 1997 
GRAVES, Associate Judge. 
*1 This is an appeal by the State of Delaware ("Employer") from a decision of the Industrial 
Accident Board ("Board") awarding worker's compensation benefits to Sylvia Glascock, the 
claimant-widow ("Claimant"), finding that her husband, George Glascock was in the course of 
his employment when he was fatally injured in an automobile accident. [FN2] Employer 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Not Reported in A.2d Page 2 
Not Reported in A.2d, 1997 WL 524078 (Del.Super.) 
(Cite as: 1997 WL 524078 (Del.Super.)) 
contends that substantial evidence does not support the Board's award and that the Board erred 
as a matter of law in finding that the accident was in the scope of employment. This is the 
Court's decision on the appeal. 
FN2. Mrs. Glascock is seeking benefits as the representative of her husband's estate, and 
therefore is referred to as the claimant in this matter, even though her husband was the 
actual employee. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
George Glascock, II, ("Glascock") worked for the State of Delaware Department of 
Corrections for 15 years, the last four as an Internal Affairs Investigator at the Delaware 
Correctional Center ("DCC") in Smyrna. On March 22, 1994, at approximately 4:20 p.m., 
Glascock was driving south on Route 1 when his vehicle struck a tractor-trailer at the 
intersection of Route 1 and Route 16. Glascock died On April 10, 1994, as a result of injuries 
suffered in the car accident. Claimant filed a petition to determine compensation due. The 
Board held a hearing on February 27, 1996. 
Claimant testified that she was married to her husband on June 14, 1968 and they had two 
children together. In his capacity as an as an Internal Affairs Investigator, Glascock was 
charged with preventing breaches of security at DCC and at hospitals where inmates might be 
confined, as well as investigating complaints from inmates and staff. Glascock's regular work 
shifts were Monday through Friday, 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., and he was on call at all other 
times, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. Claimant stated that her husband wore a 
beeper at all times so he could be contacted at any time and respond to any situation. Some 
situations could be handled over the phone; however, there were many occasions where 
Glascock had to go to Sussex Correctional Institution ("SCI") either on his way to work or on 
his way home. On other occasions, Glascock had to go to area hospitals. 
Claimant testified that Glascock also drove a State-owned vehicle, which was equipped with a 
cellular phone and a State Police radio. He only used the car for going to SCI, going to the 
hospitals or driving back and forth from work. He was not allowed to use the car for personal 
use. Employee and DCC's Warden were the only prison employees who had use of a 
State-owned vehicle. 
Claimant explained how her husband's job "set the whole pace" of their lives. Vacations were 
often canceled, and there was a period of time when they went several years without vacations. 
When they socialized, Glascock did not drink because he knew he may be called in to work. 
He was called in whenever there was an incident involving a security problem, an internal 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
Not Reported in A.2d Page 3 
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matter involving officers and a matter involving inmates getting sick or having to go to the 
hospital. There were occasions when he was called to the prison and would not be able to 
come home for three days. He also received calls at home from inmates informing him of 
potential security breaches. 
*2 On cross-examination, Claimant testified that there were occasions when Glascock would 
use his own vehicle to drive back and forth to work. Because he only could use the State car 
for business, if he knew he had personal errands to run, he would use his own car. 
Bradley J. Glascock, Glascock's son, testified that he had also worked at DCC, first as a cook 
and then as a Correction Officer. He stated that he rode to and from work with his father for 
approximately one year, up until the accident, but he was not in the car the day of the accident 
because he had been off. He testified that he made stops with his father after work at Beebe 
Hospital, Kent General, and SCI. On one occasion after work, they had to take an inmate from 
the jail, file a warrant and then take him back to the prison. 
He stated that his father did not work a regular 8:00 to 4:00 job. Although Glascock was 
physically there from 8:00 to 4:00, he then would go to the hospital or the jails and once at 
home, he would receive phone calls. On numerous occasions, Glascock was called at 2:00 in 
the morning and would have to report to the jail. Glascock always would tell the prison where 
he was, even if he was away at a restaurant. The prison even called him at home when he was 
recovering from heart bypass surgery. In addition to the State police radio, Glascock also had a 
portable radio so he could monitor communications at the prison in case something happened. 
On cross-examination, the Bradley Glascock stated that he had called to talk to his father on the 
day of the accident but that his father was too busy to talk and told his son he would call him 
back. Bradley Glascock did not hear back from Glascock and did not know where his father 
was going at the time of the accident. 
Robert E. Snyder, the Warden at DCC, testified through his deposition, which was read into 
the record. He testified that he has been the Warden at DCC since April 1, 1992, but served as 
Acting Warden as of November 1, 1991. Warden Snyder stated that Glascock's job 
responsibilities included investigating any complaints from inmates and staff and any breaches 
of security in the prison or the outside hospitals. Glascock worked 8:00 to 4:00, Monday 
through Friday and was also subject to a 24 hour on-call status at all other times. If there was a 
problem at the prison or the hospitals that required his skills, the prison notified Glascock, who 
either responded in person or on the phone. 
Warden Snyder testified that Glascock was not paid overtime for his off duty calls, but was 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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paid compensatory time, receiving credit for an equivalent amount of time it took to respond to 
a call. Glascock was provided with a State-owned police car equipped with a cellular phone, a 
police radio, handcuffs, tear gas and a weapon. Use of the car was limited to go back and forth 
to work and respond to the needs of the institution, so that it was used as a "necessary tool for 
him to accomplish his tasks of his job." The car was not to be used for any personal reasons. 
Warden Snyder was not aware of whether the use of the vehicle was part of the bargaining in 
Glascock's salary or benefits package. Glascock was not required to use the vehicle to drive 
back and forth from work and he was not reimbursed for mileage or travel expenses. 
*3 Warden Snyder further testified that Glascock had general arrest powers when on duty and 
in the event of an escape, he had full powers of a Delaware State Police Officer. However, he 
could not get involved in matters outside of his jurisdiction. If Glascock was travelling from 
the prison to meet officers at the hospital, he was on duty, but did not have general arrest power 
if he observed criminal activity on route that had nothing to do with his job. 
Warden Snyder stated that to his knowledge, Claimant was not responding to any emergency 
call or engaged in any work related activity at the time of the accident. He testified that he 
understood the accident occurred at 4:20, which was after Glascock's regular work shift usually 
ended. 
On cross-examination, Warden Snyder testified that Glascock was not responsible for any 
maintenance on the State-owned vehicle and any repairs and upkeep were performed in the 
State motor pool. He testified that he is also on-call 24 hours a day, seven days a week. He 
stated that in his opinion, being on-call meant one had to be ready with a "quick response to any 
troubled times, 24 hours a day, for the safety of the public. Key people that could resolve that 
problem, whatever may come up, would be the ones on call." 
The Board made the following findings of fact and conclusions of law: 
In this case, the Board finds that the Claimant was involved in a fatal automobile collision 
while driving a State-owned car. The Claimant was a salaried employee for the Delaware 
Department of Correction in an upper level administrative position. The Claimant was 
provided with a State-owned car as a part of the "tools" required for him to perform his job 
duties. The Claimant used the car in order to travel to and from work, as well as to travel to 
Sussex Correctional Institution and local hospitals where inmates were being treated. As a 
requirement of his position, the Claimant was on call twenty-four hours a day and carried a 
beeper that was issued to him by the employer. In addition, the Claimant would notify his 
employer whenever he was away from the prison-even when he was out at a restaurant. The 
Claimant was contacted at home on numerous occasions during the week to address a variety 
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of issues pertaining to his employment. On occasions, he had to go to the Sussex 
Correctional Institution on the way home or go to other area hospitals. The State car that he 
utilized was only for work related activities. The only other individual at the Delaware 
Correctional Center who utilized a State-owned car was the Warden himself. 
In the present case, viewing the "totality of the circumstances," the Board finds that the 
Claimant was within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his March 24, 
1994 automobile accident. The Board notes that the circumstances of the case are unique. 
The Board notes that the Claimant was on call twenty-four hours a day and seven days a 
week. He was paid a salary which covered this time, and he received compensation time 
when he was required to travel to work locations during off duty hours. While the Claimant 
had a fixed situs at the Delaware Correctional Center, he was often called upon to travel to 
Sussex Correctional Institution as well as other local area hospitals. This was a requirement 
of his job. Consequently, the Claimant had a hybrid position in which he was predominantly 
working out of one site, but was required fairly often to travel to a variety of other locations to 
perform the duties of his job. In addition, the Claimant was provided with an automobile in 
order to accomplish these tasks. While it appears that the Claimant was travelling from the 
Delaware Correctional Center to his home at the time of his accident, it is impossible to 
determine precisely the Claimant's destination. Not only could he have been travelling to his 
home, but Claimant could also have been on his way to the Beebe Hospital. 
*4 As the Board has previously indicated, the facts of this case are unique. It is not the 
Board's intention to sent [sic] a precedent that any individual who is on call twenty-four hours 
a day and seven days a week is entitled to worker's compensation benefits in the event that 
they are involved in an automobile accident on the way home. This case involves special 
circumstances that the Board has enumerated above, and its award is applicable within the 
confines of those circumstances. 
DISCUSSION 
The Supreme Court and this Court repeatedly have emphasized the limited appellate review of 
the factual findings of an administrative agency. The function of the reviewing Court is to 
determine whether substantial evidence supports the agency's decision. Johnson v. Chrysler 
Corp., Del.Supr., 213 A.2d 64, 66-67 (1965); General Motors v. Freeman, Del.Supr., 164 
A.2d 686, 688 (1960). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable 
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Oceanport Ind. v. Wilmington 
Stevedores, Del.Supr, 636 A.2d 892, 899 (1994); Battista v. Chrysler Corporation, 
Del.Super, 517 A.2d 295, 297 (1986), app. dism., Del.Supr, 515 A.2d 397 (1986). The 
appellate court does not weigh the evidence, determine questions of credibility, or make its own 
factual findings. Johnson v. Chrysler Corporation, 213 A.2d. at 66. It merely determines if the 
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evidence is legally adequate to support the agency's factual findings. 29 Del C § 10142(d). 
When factual determinations are at issue, an appellate court must take due account of the 
experience and specialized competence of the Board and of the purposes of Delaware's worker's 
compensation law. Histed v. E.I. Du Pont cle Nemours & Co., Del.Supr., 621 A.2d 340 (1993). 
Delaware's Workers' Compensation Act defines a compensable personal injury as: 
"Personal injury sustained by accident arising out of and in the course of employment": 
a. Shall not cover an employee except while the employee is engaged in, on or about the 
premises where the employee's services are being performed, which are occupied by, or under 
the control of, the employer (the employee's presence being required by the nature of the 
employee's employment), or while the employee is engaged elsewhere in or about the 
employer's business where the employee's services require the employee's presence as part of 
such service at the time of the injury .... 
19 Del. C § 2301(15)(a). This statute has been interpreted to create the so-called "going and 
coming" rule or the "premises" rule of employer nonliability. Histed v. E.I. Du Pont de 
Nemours & Co., Del.Supr., 621 A.2d 340, 343 (1993); Devine v. Advanced Power Control, 
Inc., Del.Super., 663 A.2d 1205 (1995). The rule denies compensation for injuries occurring 
during an employee's regular travel to and from work. Histed at 343. The rationale behind this 
rule is that employees face the same hazards during daily commuting trips as does the general 
public. Id. In cases of injuries occurring off the work premises, exceptions to the "premises" 
mle exist for employees who are sent on special errands, employees continuously on-call, and 
employees who are paid for their time while traveling or for their transportation expenses. 
Devine, 662 A.2d at 1210 (citing 1 A. Larson, Tlie Law of Workmen's Compensation § 16.04 
(1993)); Garrison v. State, Del.Super., C.A. No. 96A-05-004, Ridgely, PJ. (October 8, 1996) 
(ORDER), at 4. The exceptions are based on the principle that in such situations, the journey to 
or from the employer's premises is an inherent part of the service for which the worker is 
employed. Devine, 663 A.2d at 1210. 
*5 To receive compensation for her husband's death, Claimant had the burden of showing that 
at the time of the accident, her husband was acting within the course and scope of his 
employment at the time of the accident. Histed v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d at 
345; Curran v. Airport Shuttle Sei-vice, Inc., Del.Super., 238 A.2d 817, 819 (1968), affd, 
Airport Shuttle Service, Inc. v. Curran, Del.Supr., 247 A.2d 204 (1968). The question before 
the Court is whether there is substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that Glascock 
was acting within the course and scope of his employment when the accident occurred. 
Questions relating to the course and scope of employment are highly factual and therefore they 
must be resolved under a totality of the circumstances test. Histed, supra at 345. Because 
Delaware's Worker's Compensation Act must be interpreted liberally to fulfill its intended 
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compensation goal, the Board should narrowly interpret the coming and going rule and broadly 
interpret the exceptions so that the coverage is not denied wherever the injuries can fairly be 
characterized as arising out of the employment. Collier v. State, Del.Super., C.A. No. 
93A-06-022, Del Pesco, J. (July 11, 1994). 
The Delaware Supreme Court has held that when an employee is paid an identifiable amount 
as compensation for time spent in traveling to and from work, the trip is within the course of 
employment. Histed v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 621 A.2d at 345 (citing 1 A. Larson, 
The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 16.21 (1990)). Although Glascock was not paid any 
additional salary for any on-call work, he did receive compensation time for work performed 
while on-call. More importantly, Employer provided Glascock with a State-owned 
automobile, only to be used when going to and from work during regular work hours, and when 
responding to a call while on-call. No Delaware case law was found with regard to an 
employee who is on-call 24 hours a day and who also is provided with an automobile by the 
employer. However, according to Larson, supra, "in the majority of cases involving a 
deliberate and substantial payment for the expense of travel, or the provision of an automobile 
under the employee's control, the journey is held to be in the course of employment." 1 A. 
Larson, The Law of Workmen's Compensation § 16.31 (1990) (emphasis added). [FN3] The 
furnishing of an automobile for the employee's coming and going is comparable to the 
furnishing of travel expenses because there is little difference in principle between furnishing 
an amount in cash equivalent to the value of the use of employee's own car and furnishing the 
car itself. Id. at § 16.31 n. 53. 
FN3. See Arkansas Power & Light Co. v. Cox, Ark.Supr., 313 S.W. 91 (1958) (Where 
employee was subject to call at all times and used employer's automobile, equipped with 
a two-way radio, for the mutual benefit of himself and employer, a fatal accident on his 
way home was compensable as arising out of and in the course of employment); Blount 
v. State Road Dept., Fla.Supr., 87 So.2d 507 (1956) (Compensation paid for the death of 
an on-call maintenance supervisor while traveling home in a state car by the most direct 
and convenient route). 
The record indicates that Glascock had to be available 24 hours a day, seven days a week to 
answer questions and suggest solutions for whatever problems came up and, if necessary, to 
respond to matters in person. He wore a beeper at all times and always made himself available 
to Employer. The high incidence of calls and the frequency with which he had to respond to 
situations in person evidences that such responsibility imposed a genuine burden and also 
suggests that Glascock played a very significant role in preventing breaches of security at all 
hours. Clearly Employer benefitted from Glascock's ready accessibility to solve the numerous 
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problems that arose. It is not certain where Glascock was headed on Route 1 when the 
accident occurred; however, even assuming that he was coming home after a normal work day, 
that evening, like any other of his evenings, was subject to unanticipated disruption at any time 
by the demands of his job. In addition to always wearing a beeper, he drove a State-owned car 
with a police radio only when driving to and from work or when responding to a call. The 
presence of the police radio made him even more accessible to Employer when he was going to 
or coming from work. Although Glascock worked primarily out of the DCC, he routinely 
traveled to SCI or area hospitals as part of his job routine. 
*6 The combination of these factors makes it clear that the relationship between Glascockfs 
on-call responsibilities and his employment was sufficiently close to support the Board's 
finding that Glascock was in the course of his employment at the time of his death. As 
Claimant points out, each of these facts, standing alone, may be an insufficient basis for 
entitlement. However, taking all of these facts into account and looking at the totality of the 
circumstances, there is substantial evidence to support the Board's finding that Glascock was 
acting in the course and scope of his employment at the time of the accident. The Board noted 
in its opinion that its decision was based on the specific facts of this case and that its decision 
was not intended to set a precedent regarding all injured employees who are on-call 24 hours a 
day. 
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that there is substantial evidence to support the Board's 
award of benefits to Claimant, and therefore, the decision of the Board is AFFIRMED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
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